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How do societies reproduce? Berger and Luckmann popularized the idea of a continuous 
reconstruction of society (Berger & Luckmann, 1967); they showed the importance of 
education of individual members in this reproductive reconstruction. Societies are enacted 
and reproduced by human behaviour, through practice. 
Societies are not static: new objects are constructed, new phenomena occur. Tony Giddens’ 
structuration theory highlighted the two sides of this continuous reconstruction: while 
individual behaviour results from societal structure, human action also reproduces (that is: 
sustains and modifies) the structure (Giddens, 1984).  
In this reproduction process through which successive generations reproduce and gradually 
modify society, representations play an important role. Moscovici showed earlier, through his 
seminal work on psychoanalysis (Moscovici, 1961, 2008), how the process of social 
construction operates on the psychological level. He discovered the mechanism through 
which new social “objects” emerge: by anchoring their representation into previous cultural 
notions, through debate between stakeholders, until they become reified “social 
representations” (SR) which in turn may serve as anchors for future cultural innovations. 
This chapter focuses on the specific role of SR in the larger chicken-and-egg societal 
evolution outlined above. It does so in a pragmatic perspective (Installation Theory) which 
attempts to explain the phenomenon, but also provide tools for regulators and change 
agents. 
Section 1 provides a framework, installation theory, describing how societies scaffolds, 
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shapes and controls individual behaviour and the specific role of SR in that framework. 
Human behaviour is determined at three levels: affordances of the environment; 
representations and practice embodied in actors; rules enforced by institutions. An 
installation will be defined as a socially constructed system with such three layers which 
guides a specific activity, by suggesting,  scaffolding and constraining what society members 
can/should do in a specific situation (Lahlou, 2008, 2011a). Installation theory is a theory for 
nudging (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). 
 
Section 2 addresses the issue of the social (re)construction of SR. It provides a formal 
definition of SR as a set of individual representations installed in human populations (section 
2.1). This definition enables considering their transformation in an evolutionary perspective. 
We then make explicit the genetic relation of SR to the objects they represent, physical or 
not. We introduce the notion of dual selection, where the pairs (representations, objects) are 
selected for fitness both in the symbolic realm of ideas –by thought experiments and 
controversies- and in the material arena of the world of action –by empirical trials.  
1. Installation Theory 
The modern conceptions of societies as being continuously reconstructed echo older views 
pointing at how the social frames the individual (Durkheim, 1895, 1912). That societies 
reproduce themselves across successive generations of humans has been both well 
described by the functionalist approach since Talcott Parsons (Parsons, 1951) and criticized 
(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). These conceptions also point at the crucial function of 
individual behaviour in the re-construction of the system, in pattern maintenance as well as 
in innovation: while framed by the social system, the social reconstruction happens at the 
point of delivery, at least partly, through the proxy of the individuals themselves as they act. 
Describing the evolution of societies is difficult because the phenomenon is complex, in the 
sense that there are many feed-back loops between different parts of the global system 
(Bertalanffy, 1968). A purely functionalist, an-historic, analysis in not sufficient because 
evolution is path-dependant: the “causes” of the present observable state may have 
disappeared in the past.  For example, the current shape of “bottles” is only partly 
determined by function; they also bear the trace of what was technically easy to make long 
time ago with the techniques available then. The same goes with political regimes for 
example; this accounts for some peculiarities like democratic royalties. For the sake of 
simplicity we will separate the analysis of the-system-as-is from the analysis of its genesis 
and evolution, even though they must be combined in a second stage. The evolutionary 
aspects will be addressed in section 2. In the current section, we will consider the systems in 
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their homeostatic properties, focusing on how they reproduce rather than how they change. 
We present an analytical framework to describe complex social systems such as societies or 
organizations, Installation Theory. Since addressing the issue at social or structural level 
tends to occult the concrete aspects of how in practice reproduction occurs, we will analyse 
the problem from the perspective of individual actors to show how their behaviours are 
determined in the world of action. 
1.1. The World as a series of local installations that guide human behaviour 
Jakob Von Uexküll described how living organisms interact with the world-as-they-perceive-
it, their Umwelt: self-centred environment (Uexküll, 1965). For example, take the Tick (Tixus 
Ixodes). The sweat of Mammals contains butyric acid. When sensing butyric acid, the Tick 
drops from the branches where it dwells and hopefully falls on some hairy hot skin into which 
it then dips its head to suck out blood. Because Mammals are hairy, the Tick can have a firm 
grip on its prey. Because they have hot blood, a simple temperature sensor can guide the 
Tick as where to dig its head in to access blood. When the Tick has missed a prey, it tries to 
climb, driven by positive phototropism. Because the sun is above the branches, and because 
the branches are finite, the Tick ends its climbing at the edge of a branch; and there it clings 
until it smells butyric acid and restarts its foraging cycle -which may be a long wait2. The Tick 
can therefore be described as a simple but efficient interpretive system that makes sense of 
some features of its environment in order to take actions that are relevant for its existence. 
As organisms adapt to their environment, through biological evolution and individual 
experience, they embody systems of sensors and interpretation that foster adaptive 
responses to the situations they encounter. Through this phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
construction of a given organism, objects in the environment become “carriers of 
significance” for this organism: they are interpreted by the organism as connotations for 
activity. Seen from the Tick’s perspective, a Mammal is some kind of feeding installation 
which displays various affordances (Gibson, 1966, 1982, 1986) e.g. advertising food 
availability (butyric acid), sitting (hair), serving (hot soft skin) etc.  
For us Humans, a fruit would naturally carry the connotation of eating. But we have also 
been trained to make sense of complex artefacts such as restaurants, which offer Human-
friendly equivalents of what the Tick perceives in Mammals: neon-lit sign, chairs, trays etc. A 
restaurant is a man-made installation: it scaffolds a specific project (here: eating). It is usable 
by humans because they have incorporated the interpretive system that enables them to use 
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the restaurant: a representation of the “restaurant”. These representations are culturally 
constructed, they are not innate like the Tick’s; but have a similar function in enabling us to 
interpret the environment to come up with adapted responses. 
We all house individually our own representation of a “restaurant” (below: “individual 
representations”: IR) and these IR have enough similarities to enable us to communicate. 
These “shared” (we will come back to this thorny point in section 2) representations of our 
life-world are what we call social representations. IR of a given object are similar because 
produced by exposure to similar environments and experience, and because Humans 
communicate and exchange. The need to cooperate in society forces Humans to reach 
some degree of consensus about how they interpret phenomena and construct objects 
(Lahlou, 2001). 
Humans are specific in their exceptional capacity to learn, and also to modify their 
environmental niche. In fact, while simple organisms like the Tick have to rely on biological 
evolution to adapt to their environment, Humans actively modify their environment (and their 
interpretive system) to suit their needs; e.g. they create restaurants and representations of 
restaurants. This cultural niche construction (Laland, Odling-Smee, & Feldman, 2001), in 
which organisms modify the environment that will in turn have effects on their life-world as a 
species (Lewontin, 2001), is not specific to Humans but it is especially developed in our 
species. It can be considered as the essence of cultural development: new generations build 
upon experience of previous generations stored in the environment through a “ratchet” effect 
(Tomasello, 1999). 
What characterises Human installations is that they are designed with a specific purpose: 
they support a project of activity. Humans make installations for all kinds of activities. Some 
are apparently simple, such as chairs (installations for sitting) some are more complex, such 
as Intensive Care Units (installations for catering with patients in critical health condition). In 
fact, from cradle to grave, Humans continuously use installations (a cradle is an installation, 
and a grave too, and so are schools, factories, beds, homes etc.) This perspective is 
consistent with the spirit and approach of ecological psychology although our own framework 
here is much looser and less sophisticated -a trade-off for practical application. Barker’s 
behavioural settings, "stable, extra-individual units with great coercive power over the 
behaviour that occurs within them" (Barker, 1968: 17), address the same phenomena we call 
installations. 
As Uexküll showed, organisms operate by linking their environment to their interpretive 
system, hereby activating a functional loop producing adapted activity. In a functional 
perspective we cannot separate the analysis of the perception from the action. We cannot 
either separate the analysis of the representation from the analysis of its object. The 
meaning of an object is what can be done with it; the world of action is the ultimate arena for 
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the survival of social objects. 
 
The next section will detail the nature of installations and clarify how representations are a 
part of every installation. 
1.2. The three layers of installations 
In Human societies, the determinants of human behaviour are distributed: they lay in the 
subject (motives, goals, preferences, habits…) and also in the context (artefacts, rules, other 
people). In an operational perspective, for practitioners who want to understand, predict or 
influence human behaviour, the World can be considered as a series of local installations. 
Installation must be understood here in the artistic sense of assembling patterns in space 
and time to modify the way we experience this situation. To paraphrase Stanley Milgram’s 
phrase about the situation he created in his “obedience experiment” (Milgram, 1963): the 
installation carries “a momentum of its own” (Milgram, 1974: 9) .  
 
The installation of the World guides subjects into their activity track, at three levels: physical, 
psychological, social. In the following I describe these layers, and illustrate with two simple 
examples: Hat and Democracy. 
 
1) Physical layer 
The physical level refers to material properties of objects. It provides affordances (Gibson, 
1982, 1986) for activity, that is: which activities can be supported by the objects. For 
example, chairs afford sitting; buses afford transportation. One can only do what is afforded 
by the environment. This layer of installation is distributed in the physical environment by 
Nature, construction of infrastructure, and various mechanisms of supply and procurement, 
e.g. the market. 
The physical layer of Hat is the collection of hats existing in the world: your hat, my son’s 
baseball cap, etc. Hats come in millions, in different shapes and colours, but all share some 
essential protection and signalling functions as some device we wear on the head. 
The physical layer of Democracy is less obvious. Democracy is reified mostly in the form of 
processes and practice, for example in delegating decision-making. Physical installations of 
democracy include parliament, electoral registers, voting booths, but also “elections”, 
“debates” and other control and reporting systems, which are observable compound 
phenomena involving physical objects and people. 
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This first, physical, level of determination affords a tree of possible behaviours. But not 
everything that is possible will be realized; for example, I could be wearing this hat on my 
foot, but I don’t. 
 
2) Psychological layer 
This is where psychology comes into play. To take action, subjects must interpret situations 
and other phenomena into some course of action. The subject makes sense of the 
environment by recognizing some significant pattern. This recognition is not a mere bottom-
up process from the environment to the mind. Recognition is oriented and mediated, in a 
complex process that involves memory and motivation (see the effects of priming, for 
example). More trivially, translating Chinese, playing a partition, diagnosing an illness are 
sophisticated examples of how this interpretation process includes complex, feed-forward, 
top-down loops. 
I insist that “interpretation” should be understood here as more than merely associating 
ideas. Rather, I take it in the musical or theatrical sense of performing a piece of music or a 
play. Indeed, interpretation is an embodied experience and activity, involving emotion and 
motion, passion and action. It has a motor aspect (acting) as well as a mental one 
(understanding).  
Interpretation is done with IR. Neuroimaging brought empirical evidence that IR does involve 
emotions (Salzman & Fusi, 2010); e.g. fear is part of the evocation of a snake. IR does also 
involve sensori-motor areas in the brain (Barsalou, 2009). When we travel, when we are ill, 
when we engage in salutations, we engage into our own interpretation of travel, illness, 
salutation. Symbolic representations cannot be dissociated of a sensori-motor aspect, which 
connects them to the world of action. 
We all house a massive portfolio of IR which we carry around to interpret our life-world. IR 
involve the “how to act” the objects; for example a restaurant, a hat or democracy. IR also 
enable subjects to elaborate and plan behaviour, because they may be instantiated and 
processed in the physical absence of the phenomenon they represent. This (semi) autonomy 
of the IR from the object it refers to will prove a crucial property in evolution, as we will see in 
section 2.3. 
This psychological layer of installation is distributed as IR over individual Human minds, by 
the means of experience, education and exposure to discourse (media, advertising, etc.) 
Social representations theory, “SRT” (Moscovici, 1961, 2008), deals with these constructs, 
we will come back in detail to them in section 2. 
 
The psychological layer for Hat is the IR we have of hats, which include knowing hats’ shape 
and function, but also embodied motor know-how, learned through practice, by which we put 
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a hat on and off in various situations, or adjust it, fold it, clean it etc. 
The psychological layer of Democracy is the IR we have of it, which connects to the ideas of 
governance, justice etc. as well as to the embodied practices we have learned about how to 
vote, how to voice our opinion, how to respect other people’s opinions in debates etc. 
Note here that, because there is this psychological layer, an installation as we define it is 
therefore not entirely external to the actors: part of the installation resides in the actors 
themselves3. An installation cannot “work” if the user does not have the representations that 
enable her/him to play her/his part. I don’t know how to wear a turban; in many areas people 
have difficulties with interpreting democracy. 
 
3) Institutional layer 
But again, not everything that is even both possible and imaginable will be realized: a third 
level of determination, social, will cut off more branches from the tree of possibilities, and 
here institutions (Hodgson, 2006) come into play. For example, although we could drive on 
any side of the roads, only one is allowed in each country. Because individual actions 
produce externalities, they are limited by others. Institutions are a social solution to control 
potential abuse or misuse, and minimize social costs (Coase, 1960) also called “negative 
externalities”. Institutions set common conventions which enable cooperation (e.g. all must 
drive on same side of road; etc.) Many rules are already contained in the normative aspects 
of representations, but institutions are special in their capacity to enforce behaviour, by 
social pressure or more direct means. 
The institutional layer of Hat may seem minimal, but actually there are many institutions 
involved in prescribing and enforcing rules about how to make hats, how to wear them, etc. 
Professional associations of hat makers and sellers edict precise norms and rules; the 
international conventions on size are an example. But this can go much further. In 1925 
Turkey, under Mustapha Kemal’s ruling (aka Atatürk), wearing a fez was officially banned by 
a law over the reform of secularization and Westernization of Turkey. Ataturk in a speech 
described the fez as "a symbol of neglect, bigotry, and hatred of progress and civilization." 
The law apparently sentenced 3 months in prison for wearing a fez but in practice hundreds 
of people were sentenced to years of hard labour and a number of individuals were executed 
for the reason that wearing the fez was considered an invitation to rebellion.  
The current controversies around wearing the Islamic veil remind us that the use of head 
covers is far from neutral (Wagner et al. 2012). 
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If we now turn to Democracy, it is obvious that institutional rules formalized in laws, rules, 
and conventions and reified in various bodies are a crucial layer of construction, guideline 
and control for this “object”. 
 
So, at a given moment, individual behaviour is determined by this distributed installation: 
objects installed in the physical environment, interpretive systems installed in humans, and 
institutions installed in society. Material objects do have their say in social interaction 
because they enable, scaffold or prevent practice; they are “actants” (Akrich, Callon, & 
Latour, 2006). While this may seem obvious, social psychology has long neglected material 
objects. Recent developments about interobjectivity (Moghaddam, 2003) and the debate 
started in the field of SR (Sammut, Daanen, & Sartawi, 2010) will hopefully change this 
situation. SR studies so far have mostly focused on discourse, and objects as well as 
behaviour have been somewhat neglected (Wagner, 1994). 
  
An installation is the result of a social construction, but through its scaffolding properties it is 
also instrumental in the process of reproductive re-construction of society. For example, 
“priority seats” in the public transports (“for people who are disabled, pregnant or less able to 
stand”) are the reification of social constructs such as courtesy, handicap etc. and in turn 
they may reproduce (and modify) these constructs in the same process where they support 
specific behaviours. Most of these installations are emergent historical productions to which 
no specific author can be attributed (e.g. “hospital”); still they do carry agency and 
intentionality because they were designed to solve problems in the world of action (hats: 
head protection; democracy: governance etc.) As we will see in conclusion, Installation 
theory is of course intended to help change agents and regulators to improve current 
installations or design new ones. 
 
We above examined how, in practice, society is continuously scaffolding, shaping and 
nudging the behaviour of individuals with installations. This clarifies the role of Social 
Psychology in this framework. Because some determinants of behaviour lay in the context, 
psychological theories alone cannot explain or predict behaviour. But because some 
determinants are psychological and social, a social psychological approach is indispensable 
to analyse the second layer. 
 
The 3-layer framework of Installation theory is of course very schematic. It is deliberately so 
to enable a first orientation in the complex socio-technical systems which regulators and 
change agents must deal with; it provides a simple check-list for analysis and agenda for 
action. 
9 
 
 
 
 
The next section will focus on the psychological layer, describe how IR are distributed over 
Human populations as SR; and then deal with the evolutionary aspects of representations.  
2. Social representations and their evolution 
The previous section framed a systemic vision of society where IR are in one layer, 
embodied in Humans. We will now look how representations are linked with the other layers; 
and how their evolution is connected with them. 
2.1. Representations and objects 
In society, we share the built environment of “objects” that surround us. This built 
environment includes simple physical “objects”, phenomena like chairs or apples, but also 
more complex “objects” which are experienced as systems, situations or processes: 
phenomena like hospitals, nations, democracy, or justice. These “objects” are meaningful 
compounds which humans identify as coherent functional units because they emerge as an 
installation scaffolding some specific activity. Lorentz, after Uexküll, defined an object as 
“that which moves as a unitary whole” (Lorenz, 1935). This is true for physical objects (this is 
why we would for example identify “a crowd”, “a bee hive” or “a suit” as a single unit although 
they are composed of several parts which “go together”); but it is true also for more complex 
objects like a hospital (including the building, equipment, staff, procedures) or justice (courts, 
lawmen, laws, trials). Because we Humans have a more sophisticated nervous system than 
the Tick, we are able to subsume a considerable amount of elementary perception-action 
loops under a single overarching framework, which we can mobilize to address a specific 
phenomenon; therefore making a series of specific exploratory strategies and responses 
readily available to address a given “object” in its various dimensions. I have showed 
elsewhere how some partial aspects of the phenomenon can prompt by association the 
activation of a complete representation of the global phenomenon (e.g. from the visual 
perception of an apple I will evoke the representation of food and eating), which in turn 
empowers the subject to process relevant and adapted activity with the object at hand 
(Lahlou, 1995).  
A simple empirical criterion for identifying what humans consider as “objects” is often the fact 
that they are designated by a single word or expression (e.g. “hospital”).In what follows, I will 
use the term “object” in that general sense of a phenomenon that is, in practice, considered 
as one single entity, whatever its nature: purely material, compound of material and other, or 
whatever (“swimming pool”, “bus”, “fear”, “religion”). Empirically, a list of what is considered 
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as “objects” by a given society can be found in its Encyclopaedias and dictionaries. 
 
Because we use objects in daily activity, each of us has a representation of these objects: 
we all have representations of hats, restaurants, Intensive Care Units, democracy, etc. 
Because the representation is designed to interpret the phenomenon, individual 
representations (IR) of different people tend to have something in common, since they 
couple with the same “object”. For example, the IR of “apples” tends to be similar among 
various individuals, as some edible fruit that grows on trees. In their detail, IR will vary: 
cooks, farmers, grocers and consumers may have developed more specific aspects of their 
own representation of apples following to their own individual experience.  
 
“[A] social representation is not completely shared, it is only partially distributed, just as part of the 
meaning of words is known to some people and unknown to others. Therefore everyone lacks some 
item of the knowledge that other speakers possess. [new paragraph] I can even add that if all people 
pictured things to themselves in a similar way, they would be nothing but mirrors engaged in specular 
conversations. In short, they would be a mass of individuals reproduced in thousands of exemplars, not 
a real society. In real societies, people routinely understand some statements as agreeing with their 
social representation and others as conflicting with it” (Moscovici, 1994, p.168) 
The social division of labour enhances this effect of distributed knowledge which (Roqueplo, 
1990) calls “savoir décalé”: we do not all need to know everything, what matters is that 
“those who act” have an operational representation. 
But, because we all communicate, usually a large part of the representation is shared, 
enough at least to enable necessary cooperation about this specific object. This does not 
mean that representations are consensual (Rose et al., 1995), nor that we would all “share” 
the same representation (see below a discussion of this idea). In fact representations may 
vary considerably in content within a population, and there is ample literature regarding their 
diversity and content, in fact they may even appear contradictory (Castro, 2006; 
Jovchelovitch, 2008; Moloney, Hall, & Walker, 2005; Provencher, 2011). 
 When we study the construction of society, because representations are essential to 
communication and cooperation, we are interested in the way these representations are 
created, reproduced, and evolve. This is what SRT is primarily about (Abric, 1987, 1994; 
Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Doise, 1986; Flament, 1994; Guimelli, 1994a, 1994b; Jodelet, 1989; 
Lahlou, 1998; Moscovici, 1994). We are also interested in how representations connect with 
action and practice (including communication and reasoning), since this is a functional role 
of representation. This has also been studied extensively (Abric, 1994, 2003; Flament, 1994; 
Guimelli, 1994b; Jodelet, 1983), although less in depth than the way representations are 
communicated. 
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2.2. Individual representations and social representations 
A social representation of a phenomenon (e.g. illness, democracy, etc.) can be seen as the 
set its individual representations, distributed over the members of society. Let us consider 
SR as sets of IR4. For example, the SR of “hospital” in the UK is the set of the millions of IR 
of “a hospital” held by the British population. 
More technically, in the mathematical theory of sets (Cantor, 1874; Halmos, 1960; Runde, 
2005), an intensional description defines a set by some properties of its elements (e.g. a rule 
or semantic description; necessary and sufficient conditions). An extensional definition 
explicitly lists all the individual elements of the set. E.g. an intensional definition of “Dogs” 
could be “Mammal that barks”: {x ∈ Mammals : x barks}, while an extensional definition 
would be “the physical set of all animals that are called dogs on the planet”: {Rex, Laika, 
Lassie, etc.}. Social representations, as any set, can therefore be defined in intension or in 
extension. 
 
Classic SRT implicitly takes the intensional approach; it describes the properties of the SR of 
an object; see, typically, the structural approach developed in Aix by Abric and colleagues 
(Abric, 2003; Flament, 1981; Guimelli, 1998; Moliner, 1994). As individual representations 
are easily observable empirically, these intensional properties are usually inferred by some 
data extraction and analysis technique from a sample of IR. For example, the SR of 
“studying” is found by (Lheureux, Rateau, & Guimelli, 2008) to contain the following cognitive 
elements: Knowledge, Investment, Diploma, Culture, Future,  Work, Job, Long term, 
University; this is obtained through questionnaires filled  by a sample of students. More 
generally, SR are usually studied by analysing what is common or similar in individual 
representations or discourses about the object by individual subjects. 
 
Taking an extensional approach means considering a SR as “the set of all individual 
representations of the object”. While this is not practical for description, it is essential to 
understand how representations disseminate and evolve as a set. This also opens the 
avenue for considering the intensional properties of the SR as statistical characteristics of 
the set of the corresponding individual representations, as is implicitly done by all the 
techniques based on the analysis of samples of IR. This clarifies the epistemological status 
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of the notion and provides clean theoretical ground for the classic methods of characterizing 
the intensional properties of SR. 
There is a difference in logical type (Russell, 1908; Whitehead & Russell, 1962) between 
individual and social representation. This difference is similar to the one between token and 
type in logics (you can eat a specific apple, but you cannot eat the APPLE type; one 
individual can have her own IR of a hospital, but she does not embody the full SR of the 
hospital). Technically, a class (here: SR) is of a logical type higher than its members (here: 
IR). A class cannot contain itself as a member: a SR cannot be an IR. As sets, SR have 
properties that the IR do not have5. 
Among other things the diversity of their elements (IR) enable SR with evolutionary capacity, 
like the diversity of a biological species provides room for evolution of that species as a 
population as we shall see below in section 2.2. Also, crucial is that IR are not independent 
of each other, they crossbreed and reproduce as members of the set (there is discussion, 
controversy, influence, education). Finally, this set of individual representations is linked by 
the representation process to their object, which is another source of interdependency. This 
is why SR differ from “memes” (Dawkins, 1976), and more generally why SRT is different 
from the naïve approach of “shared” representations, that considers a set of multiple 
replicated occurrences of a single representation distributed over a population. This 
simplistic view misses some crucial points as just stated above. 
This last misconception is well described by (Harré, 1984): “The weight of an army is a 
distributive property, while its organization is a property of the collective. As far as I can see, 
the concept of représentation sociale is used by the French school as a distributive property 
of groups”. Let us be fair: this inaccurate distributive interpretation of SRT is widespread 
among many users of the theory, and there is a real ambiguity in the core texts regarding the 
epistemic status of SR. This has been noted many times (Billig, 1988; Jahoda, 1977; 
McKinlay & Potter, 1987; Potter & Edwards, 1999; Potter & Litton, 1985; Potter & Wetherell, 
1987). The fact that most descriptions of representations are done in intensional mode did 
nothing to help clarifying the issue. I hope it is now clarified. Most important to note is that 
this formal definition of SR as sets of IR provides solid epistemological ground for all 
techniques that describe SR based on surveys on samples of IR.  
The heart of the matter is that there is no opposition between the individual and the social; of 
course individual representations are inherently social, since they are socially constructed. 
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individual representations are a moving target: they are fuzzy and change all the time in number and detail 
(panta rhei!). The idea that we should consider the set as a type, while useful for the issue of SR, has some 
technical and metaphysical limitations. See the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (section “Type and 
Token”) for a detailed discussion. 
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Nevertheless they have some autonomy. Conversely, even though the social is constructed 
by an aggregate of individuals, it has some autonomy (it will survive even when individual 
members die) and emergent properties at the level of its logical type (e.g. structure, internal 
variability etc.) Individual and social is another type of chicken and egg issue. 
Considering SR as sets seemed to raise some surprise when I first proposed it (Lahlou, 
2010) so I assume it will take some time to sink in; but it is necessary to take an evolutionary 
perspective.6.  
2.3. The evolution of social representations 
Considering SR as sets enables understanding better how they evolve. Their evolution is 
similar to the evolution of a biological population, by local mutations of IR, and adaptation to 
their ecosystem constituted by the culture and the society, and more specifically to the 
objects they represent. Dennett considers "evolution occurs whenever the following 
conditions exist: (1) variation: there is a continuing abundance of different elements (2) 
heredity or replication: the elements have the capacity to create copies or replicas of 
themselves and (3) differential 'fitness': the number of copies of an element that are created 
in a given time varies, depending on interactions between the features of that element and 
features of the environment in which it persists." (Dennett, 1996: 343) These conditions 
apply to IR: they are continuously reproduced through discourse and practice, and this 
reproduction is subject to some fitness criteria. 
 
Evolution of human societies is a chicken-and-egg process, as all evolutionary processes. 
But it is more complex than natural evolution because it also takes place in the symbolic 
realm, as we show below. This will clarify the relation between layer 1 (physical) and 2 
(representations. 
                                                          
 
6
 In his studies on the “contagion” of ideas, anthropologist Dan Sperber developed an epidemiological approach 
to representations; strangely it is rarely cited in SR literature. What he calls “cultural representations” is very 
close to the notion of SR, even though here too, the distinction of logical type between individual and social 
representation is unclear. "Among the mental representations, some - a very small proportion - are 
communicated, that is to say, bring their user to produce a public representation which in turn leads another 
individual to construct a mental representation of similar content to the initial representation. 
Among the representations provided some - a very small proportion - are communicated repeatedly and may 
even end up being distributed in the whole group, that is to say have a mental version in each of its members. 
We call cultural representations such representations that are widely distributed within a social group and 
inhabit this group durably. 
Cultural representations as defined are a fuzzy subset of the set of mental and public representations housed by a 
social group.” (Sperber, 1996: 50, my translation) 
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Of course representations can to some extent reproduce through discourse. But that is not 
the only way; practice is another way. Representations and objects follow a co-evolution 
process: representations are constructed by the practical experience people have of objects. 
E.g. people learn about “hats” by using hats, or by sharing experience with other people who 
know about hats. Conversely, objects are made (built, constructed) after the pattern of their 
representation: hats are made after representations of hats, firemen are trained to behave as 
firemen; democracies are constructed in political debates about democracy, etc. In other 
words, SR serve as templates for constructing the world in practice. This is the reason why 
representations match with objects: it is not by chance but by design; at least for Man-made 
artefacts, the objects have been designed after their representation7. 
 
Let me now draw your attention on the fact that objects also come in sets, and that they are 
also distributed over human populations. For example, we notice that a set of hats is 
distributed over the population of Humans. Most of us own one, sometimes several. There 
are many democracies as well, each with its specificities. The world is full of such sets of 
similar objects, just as it is full of sets of similar representations. 
Therefore, for each “object” (hat, democracy, etc.) we usually have three sets to consider: 
the population of humans; the set of IR of the object which inhabit humans; the set of 
observable phenomena that are subsumed by the name of the object (hats, instances of 
democracy8). These sets verify the three Darwinian conditions above where laws of 
evolution apply. Let us forget here, for a given object, the population of humans who evolve 
at a different pace, to focus on the set of IR (the SR of the object) and the set of objects 
themselves. They seem to act as populations, in the sense that they inhabit the same 
geographical area and are capable of interbreeding (cf. what we saw above, they are taken 
in a chicken and egg reproduction cycle). But the reproduction cycle appears more complex 
than for biological species, because, while representations can to some extent reproduce 
among themselves alone (e.g. through oral or other symbolic transmission), material objects 
do not reproduce by themselves.  
Nevertheless, while representations and objects are taken in a chicken-and-egg process, 
each form of the object (material, symbolic) is continuously tested for fitness in its own 
                                                          
 
7
 Because representations are constructed from the objects, and vice versa, it becomes ontologically difficult to 
separate the representation from its object. Especially since, from the subject’s perspective, “the representation 
is what it represents” (Lahlou, 1998). This is a thorny epistemological issue. Asking whether the object and the 
representation are different is a bit like asking if the chicken and the egg are different, they are different 
manifestations of a single process. 
8
 And here, we do not only mean governments, but what people would consider an instance of democracy, e.g. 
an election process). 
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realm.  
Reified objects endure a “reality test” that is: can they survive the confrontation with other 
objects in the arena of the world of action? Does this device work? Is this hat good 
protection? Is this democracy sustainable? In this reality arena, only the fitter survive. 
At the same time, representations undergo “thought experiments” in the symbolic realm: Is 
this representation acceptable? Is it compatible with the local culture? Is it (politically, 
ethically, culturally etc.) correct? In this symbolic arena, only the fitter survive. Survival here 
often means that this representation will be used to design objects or action in the real world. 
This separate evolution of phenomena and their representation is possible because, as we 
have seen in section 1.2.2 (for IR) and 2.2 (for SR), representations have some autonomy 
from their object. Even though, as seen from the subject’s perspective, the representation is 
what it represents because the subject only has access to her own representation, in fact the 
individual representation and the phenomenon are located in different places (inside the 
individual and out there) and therefore can be changed independently. But, in the course of 
evolution, when a new variant emerges, should the new object OR the new representation 
fail the fitness test, they will be eliminated. This is what I mean by a “dual selection process”. 
Objects have a dual form, symbolic (representations) and concrete (in the world of action). 
Instead of a simple trial-and-error process selecting variants, like in the natural selection of 
biological organisms (Darwin 1859), we see here a more complex, but also more economical 
process, where objects are selected twice, in each of their forms (symbolic, concrete), by 
“thought experiments” and reality tests. For example, one can imagine making hats of 
human baby skin –but this solution is not culturally acceptable (it is does not fit the 
psychological layer); one can also try making hats out of spaghetti but the first rainfall will 
demonstrate they do not fit the physical layer. 
This dual selection applies to material objects (hats, cars) as well as to more virtual objects 
(democracy, education) of which the “concrete” form emerges in the substance of situations 
and practices. 
This clarifies the role of representations in the societal evolution. They are the symbolic form 
of objects in our culture. This symbolic form can be modified and selected for fitness through 
mental simulation and discourse, in though experiments which are must faster and cheaper 
than material trial-and-error in the world of action. Therefore representations enable a much 
faster and cheaper evolution of the material form, through the “thought experiment” side of 
the dual selection mechanism. While this could be done at the level of a single IR (and this is 
sometimes the case in creativity), doing this on populations of representations (SR) brings 
the efficiency of distributed evolutionary mechanisms. SR are a form of collective intelligence 
(Lahlou, 2011b), and therefore irreducibly social. 
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2.4. The role of institutions 
Those who tried wearing a fez under the Kemal regime soon enough discovered at their 
expense it did not fit the institutional layer at the time –it must have been hard times for fez 
makers in Turkey.  
At societal level, the co-evolution of objects and representations is monitored by domain-
local communities of interest and stakeholders (users, providers, public authorities, etc.) who 
set the patterns of objects, the rules of practice and more generally what is allowed in the 
public space. Because these stakeholders know the field, objects, representations and rules 
are adapted to behaviours. These stakeholders create institutions, which are both sets of 
rules to be applied to maintain order and foster cooperation, and communities of interest 
aware that they are playing in the same game. We now see better the evolutionary role of 
institutions as a social monitoring and control system overlooking the reproduction of objects 
and practices. 
Indeed, knowing how to use the affordances is not always sufficient to execute adequate 
behaviour. Some people might do something wrong and provoke (by ignorance, personal 
interest…) negative externalities for themselves or others. Institutions are a social answer: 
they create and enforce rules to control misuse or abuse; they set common conventions 
enabling cooperation (e.g. all should drive on the same side of the road).  
As said above, many of these rules are already contained in the mental representations, 
which are by nature normative (Guimelli, 1998). But institutions come with a physical control 
layer of these norms. They enforce them with special personnel. Also, every loyal member of 
the community tends to serve as a rule-enforcer and bring others back on track. Often these 
rules are made formal and explicit (regulations, laws, etc.), but they may remain informal 
rules of good practice, tricks of the trade or traditions. As these rules are the result of 
compromise between local interests, they vary from place to place.  
While Installation theory considers for the sake of pragmatic simplicity the institutional layer 
as separate from the others, we can see that in fact it is deeply entangled with the two other 
layers, just as the two first were entangled in a chicken and egg genetic process – but space 
lacks to discuss this here9. 
 
                                                          
 
9
 Of course, as institutions are also objects, and there are representations of institutions. And individual 
representations are also constructed by institutions. The distinction between the three layers is a gross pragmatic 
simplification. Since each of the “layers” is, in its genesis, co-constructed by/with the others there cannot be a 
clean epistemic cut. Models are not the phenomena, but only a simplified and practical way to deal with them, 
and in this respect the Installation framework is no exception. We made here a trade-off between simplicity and 
precision. 
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As SR are about the construction of real-world phenomena, which are important stakes for 
the society members, economic and political factors also intervene which reflect the interests 
and projects of members (Lahlou, 2008). Because construction is a social process, psycho-
social mechanisms intervene. The cognitive content and structure of social representations 
reflect this historical, path-dependant and psycho-social process by which they were 
constructed. The co-evolution between artefacts and representations is done under 
monitoring and control of stakeholder communities, which create and use institutions as 
social and economic instruments to safeguard their interests. Institutions reflect the rapports 
de force between stakeholders, and they evolve as these rapports de force themselves 
evolve.  
 
Social construction is therefore a complex evolutionary process, multi-layered and path 
dependant, where material objects and their representations evolve as two semi-
autonomous sets distributed over -and used by- populations of Humans as scaffolding 
instruments to interpret the world and act upon it. Objects themselves are not passive; they 
are actants which contribute to the interactions with and between humans. Humans have 
constructed institutions as social instruments to control the reproduction and evolution of 
these sets of scaffolding instruments; and these institutions themselves evolve as a result of 
rapports de force between humans communities in the installation they build. 
 
3. Conclusion 
This paper introduced a framework, Installation Theory, where the determinants of individual 
behaviours are scaffolded, shaped and constrained at three levels: affordances of the 
physical environment, IR embodied in humans, and institutions in the social world. This 
installation of the world carries its own momentum, and accounts for the reproduction of 
societies and their subsystems. 
We defined social representations as sets of individual representations; they are therefore of 
a higher logical type than individual representations. This distinction clarifies a series of 
ambiguities in SRT. SR are sets of entities that reproduce under conditions for fitness, their 
evolution follows the Darwinian processes. We showed however that the evolutionary 
process of SR is more complex because they co-evolve with their object, and undergo a dual 
selection process. Mutation and selection occur simultaneously in two realms, material and 
symbolic. This is also one of the reasons for the efficiency of SR as a superiorly efficient 
distributed process of collective intelligence. 
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The three layers of installation interact in entangled chicken-and-egg manner: material 
objects and representations co-evolve by trial and error as they re-construct each other; 
institutions monitor and control the process according to social rapports de force.  
We have therefore contributed to show how SR enable societal evolution, in practice and in 
relation with objects and institutions, 
 
Some theoretical issues are left pending or loosely formalized to some degree, and need 
further development. Nevertheless, while I believe that a tighter degree of formalism still 
needs to be reached in SRT, I would suggest that in this endeavour we should find a trade-
off between the enthusiasm of scholarship and the pragmatic value of our models. Simple 
models are less exact but more practical. One of the reasons of the long-lasting success of 
SRT, and of its many uses in policy-making, is precisely that the theory is a bit loose. In this 
same vein, Installation theory is deliberately kept simple. 
If we want to change the World, or more modestly one of its sub-domains, Installation theory 
makes it clear that action limited to a single layer of determination alone -for example a new 
product or a media campaign- is unlikely to change the behaviours of people in a sustainable 
manner. We should make sure that appropriate installation in all three layers (physical 
environment, individuals concerned, and relevant institutions) has been addressed. What is 
left to us is the strategy of how to create and distribute such installation. For example, we 
could start by the physical layer by procuring new products, then try to recruit some 
institutions so they take over the educative part of the installation: changing representations. 
 
More generally, by understanding better the role of SR, and more generally of the cultural 
installation, in the social continuous re-construction of our world, we can better intervene to 
improve it. As we saw, this cannot be done by social psychologists alone, because there are 
other layers of determination than psychological; but we also saw that social psychology is 
an essential part of the picture, and that the symbolic aspects of the dual evolutionary 
mechanism of society, and especially social representations, are the key to collective 
intelligence. 
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